The legality principle within the italian criminal justice system: normative principles and practical adaptations by M.L.Zanier
Maria Letizia Zanier
The Legality Principle within the Italian Criminal 
Justice System: Normative Principles and Practical 
Adaptations 
In: Beyond the statute law: the “grey” government of criminal justice 
systems. History and Theory in the modern age, edited by Luigi Lacchè, 
Monica Stronati, Macerata, eum, 2011, pp. 95-124.

Maria Letizia Zanier
The Legality Principle within the Italian Criminal Justice 
System: Normative Principles and Practical Adaptations
1. Introduction 
Normative principles necessarily need to adapt to certain 
factual contexts. These practical adaptations vary according to 
the legal actors and the legal context within which normative 
principles are applied. Thus, it is crucial to study legal actors’ 
professional culture, in order to grasp the complexity and the 
structure of contemporary legal systems.
As it is acknowledged, in some systems of civil law – for 
instance, the Italian one – the prosecution is compulsory, even 
if this principle often represents more a myth than a real fact. A 
similar compulsoriness is not normatively prescribed in common 
law systems, but it must not imply that the prosecutor renounces 
to remain neutral when taking decisions. The Italian criminal 
justice system is chronically affected by lack of resources and a 
substantial backlog that influence magistrati’s1 job. This pushes 
prosecutors to take discretionary decisions that, de facto, affect 
the legality principle. In particular, they can define the crime 
problem by determining priorities in prosecuting (Nelken, 
Zanier 2006; Zanier 2007; 2009).
Thanks to a theoretical review and the presentation of 
empirical data concerning Italy2, this paper aims to contribute 
1  Prosecutors and judges are both regarded as belonging to the same professional 
category (called magistratura) and they are both called magistrati.
2  The research, whose results are partially presented in this text, is based on 
the empirical study of subjective practices realised by the operators of the law in the 
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to the debate about the relevant topic of compulsory prosecution 
in the penal system in our country. Then, we will focus on 
other practices and, in particular, on the discretionary powers 
that legal actors retain in the everyday work. Firstly, we will 
analyze the role of specialized units. Prosecution offices and, 
sometimes, courts are organized according to specialized units 
dealing with specific crimes (e. g. white-collar crimes, organized 
crimes, etc.). Secondly, the implementation of the riti alternativi 
will be discussed. These are special proceedings, like plea-
bargaining, that are triggered by the parties and were designed 
to combat the perennial case backlog of the Italian criminal 
justice system. The criteria to apply these proceeding do not 
seem to be homogeneous in every prosecution office. Finally, the 
importance of the prescrizione3 will be taken into consideration. 
This may vary depending on the legal and factual context, the 
crime committed and even the social position of those involved 
in the investigation and trial.
In essence, legal actors’ professional and legal culture is 
vital information to understand and to construe the theoretical 
field of socio-legal contexts. It was conducted by the Author under the guidance and 
coordination of Prof. David Nelken trough interviews with privileged witnesses at 
different Italian courts. Thereby, between June and December 2002, we interviewed 
operators of law such as the President of a penal section, the President of a section 
G.i.p. (Preliminary Investigation Judge) – G.u.p. (Preliminary Hearing Judge), the 
Chief Attorney (or his Associate or Substitute), the Director of the penal chancellery 
and two criminal Lawyers in each court. The data were collected by the research 
“The reasonable length of the trail. Guarantees and efficiency of criminal justice” 
conducted as a base of a project co-financed by the Italian Ministry of Education, 
University and Scientific Research. All told, the study, of which we are presenting 
some results in this paper, was object of further publications (Nelken, Zanier 2006; 
Zanier 2006, 2007, 2009).
3  This legal concept indicates that there is a limitation of actions. Prosecutors 
have a time limit to put forward the accusation. This is not fixed, but it depends from 
the crime which has been committed (the more the crime is serious, the more there is 
time, some crimes can always be prosecuted). It is also important to know that the 
fact that a trial has begun does not block the time limit. So a criminal process can 
arrive, for example, at the court of appeal and then is blocked (by the judge) because 
of prescrizione. In these situations the accused person(s) is de facto acquitted. He/
she is not formally innocent (sometimes they are clearly guilty) but he/she can not be 
prosecuted and/or tried anymore (or any longer) for that crime. We should also add 
that prescrizione could have consequences for prosecutors’ career. Being seen to have 
allowed prescrizione to take place deliberately could involve ministerial and CSM 
(Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura) disciplinary hearings.
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framework of a legal system. In this sense, the academic debate 
on criminal procedures should also take into consideration legal 
actors’ point of view, because they are the “front line” that 
everyday has to face the challenges connected with the practical 
adaptation of normative legal objectives. And they are also 
partially responsible for the good functioning of the criminal 
justice system or, at least, a part of it.
2. Prosecution in the systems of common law and civil law 
It may turn out to be useful, even if done synthetically, for 
the understanding of the principle of discretionary prosecution 
in these systems, to retrace the modalities of the organisation 
of prosecutorial structures in a country of common law, for 
instance in the United States.
Regarding the American prosecutional organs, it is important 
to highlight that their nomination is carried out politically, 
when it comes to the district attorney. A counterbalance for this 
constitutes the accredited independence given to this person who 
is strengthened by the awareness of being able to leave the office 
and return almost always successfully to the private profession 
(Eisenstein 1979). The American Prosecutor’s Department, 
that exercises a wide discretion in deciding if and how the 
prosecution takes place, also assumes the fundamental role of 
regulating the flow of cases entering the system (demands for 
justice). Guarnieri (1984), quoting Reiss (1976), recalls that in 
the United States the prosecutor4 adopts behaviours oriented to 
discretionary power in at least five ways: in deciding whether or 
not to carry out a prosecution; in the relevant option to charge 
defendant with which specific offense; in the decision whether 
or not to archive an ongoing trial via the procedure called nolle 
prosequi; in the negotiation with the accused for an admission 
of his guilt in return of a benignant attitude from the prosecutors 
and eventually from the court (plea-bargaining); in the settling 
of what kind of strategy should be sustained during the trial. 
4  A figure in some aspects superposable with the one of the public prosecutor of 
the systems of civil law. 
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From the illustrated characteristics derives the inevitable, more 
than outstanding, autonomy of the prosecutor, but also the 
accentuation of the local disparity in criminal policies. Like 
that, even the American system wished reforms mostly go in the 
direction of a greater uniformity of the discretionary decisions 
of the prosecutor, of a higher centralisation of the federal 
organisation of the prosecution officies and of a more systematic 
control from the judges. Some academics have suggested a greater 
commitment of professional career prosecutors. Nevertheless, the 
extreme decentralisation and influence exerted by the political 
community remain peculiar aspects of the prosecutional system 
in the United States. 
Just like the prescriptions by norms, even the non-normative 
standards that impact the behaviour of the prosecutor 
(mechanisms of informal type by taking decisions, public 
judgment, political contextual situation – important above all 
for the American reality – inner and administrative organisation 
of the system even at local level) present characteristics that are 
not at all homogenous in the systems of the common law in 
comparison to those of the civil law. By following a comparative 
approach, we can derive precious indications to understand the 
philosophical meaning, and the legal one, that rules the thesis of 
discretion/compulsoriness, its setbacks in the evolution and its 
time in the criminal proceeding (Zanier 2009). 
As we have anticipated, the prosecutor in the Anglo-Saxon 
systems does not apply criminal law mechanically; on the 
contrary, forms of discretion pervade a lot of aspects of his 
work, starting with the investigations, with the acceptance of the 
rites of alternative type (plea-bargaining) or with the decision 
to go to trial. Nevertheless, the discretion does not imply that 
such strategies are random or lacking regularity in decisional 
standards5. We could add that the prosecutor proceeds incorrectly 
5  «Note that the decisional ‘principles’ have nothing to do with ‘policies’. The 
‘policies’ relate to another series of rules and standards specifically used to take par-
ticular categories of decisions. The prosecutor’s offices, especially the ones that deal 
with a big number of similar cases, often adopt particular policies in order to bring 
consistency and administrative efficiency […]. The ‘principles’, however, refer to nor-
mative fundamental premises concerning the modalities to take decisions form the 
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whenever his actions lack of neutrality, even if the dimensions of 
such a concept remain to be identified. As Zacharias and Green 
(2004) indicate, a first aspect of neutrality of the prosecutor – 
on which lies the substantial accord between scholars – is the 
one that defines it as an non-biased behaviour, uninfluenced by 
external factors when taking decisions. The presumed distortions 
could affect actions that are determined by ethnic, racial or 
religious prejudices – subjects that have for a long time been very 
sensitive issues in the United States – and that start, even in our 
country, to gain importance with the increase of immigration 
and the criminality linked to it. More simply, the behaviours of 
the prosecutor could also be indulged by personal interests in 
whom he is involved. Secondly, the neutrality of the prosecutor 
foresees that non-partisan decisions are taken. In this case, the 
outlines of the concept appear less clear and concrete regarding 
the preceding dimension, because the second one has to do with 
notions of independence from other actors, the objectivity in the 
valuation of evidences, the autonomy from the political agenda. 
The third condition of neutrality requires that the prosecutor 
founds its decisions on criteria that can be instantly identified 
and that are consistently applied. In essence, all dimensions of 
neutrality of the accusation share the latent premise that the 
prosecutor exerts the discretionality in a non-arbitrary way. As 
Zacharias and Green conclude, such an objective is in theory 
not attainable, unless on a very general and abstract level. We 
probably all agree on the fact that this part of the trial has to be 
“neutral”, just like it should be “honest” and generally “follow 
the aims of justice”. Nevertheless, none of these propositions 
present an unambiguous meaning, because it deals with a proxy 
of a constellation of other normative expectations, most often 
vague, concerning the modalities of the decisional behaviour. 
Therefore, the theoretical analysis suggests the necessity 
to rethink the role of the prosecutor in the light of a series 
of principles and under-principles that have been publically 
listed to orientate the action. At this point, it is useful to come 
side of the prosecutor and should constitute the ideal requirements to the policies and 
to the decision to take ad hoc» (Zacharias, Green 2004, p. 8).
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with a similar approach to suggest a critical discussion of the 
penal system in Italy and of its eventual reforms. The concept 
of “neutrality” of the prosecutors can adopt a wide range of 
meanings, but theoretically each concept refers to the decision-
taking based on a consistent application of rules that are founded 
in the law and in the way of understanding society from the 
side of its members. Even if the standard of “neutrality” does 
not procure a dividing line to define the “good” behaviour of 
the prosecutors in specific cases, it offers nevertheless the cue 
to criticize eventual inadequacies of realising the consistency/
coherency of his actions.
The empirical material that we have collected by interviewing 
the operators of law reveals that the main difficulty resides in 
the fact that in our penal system the public prosecutors (pubblici 
ministeri) are not given the possibility to identify normatively 
a series of decisional criteria, if not on an informal level and 
territorially delimited6. The interviews with privileged witnesses 
confirm that a similar modality would rather be welcomed 
by many. Rethinking about the consideration concerning the 
American system, potential reforms should go in the direction 
of providing the articulation of standardised guiding-criteria 
to orientate the actions of the prosecutors in the single offices. 
Such principles are partially elaborated at local level in order 
to better adhere to demands coming from the actions of legal 
culture in each juridical office. The principles should relapse in 
the orbit of normative criteria and be identified at a superior 
level (from the side of politicians, lawyers, representatives of the 
operators of law), to which the consensus of the public opinion 
also converges (Nelken, Zanier 2006; Zanier 2007, 2009).
Considering in more details the reality of the Italian 
penal system, it emerges that, despite the introduction of the 
adversarial system with the new code, some columns of the 
6 Among the very few empirical researches on the subject of compulsoriness/
discretionality of prosecution that were conducted in Italy, considering the practical 
role of the operators of law and using non-standard techniques (direct and participat-
ing observations), the one of Fabri (1997) merits to be quoted because it highlights 
how the discretion of the prosecutors is spread, significantly, further than locally and 
individually discontinuous. 
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old inquisitorial system continue to persist. Among them, the 
principle of compulsoriness of prosecution takes a pre-eminent 
position from the point of view of the legal theory as well as 
of the relapsed practices on the management of procedures. 
Among the other things, this aspect of the law is seen by some 
lawyers and operators as one of the causes that contributes to 
determine the excessive length of Italian trials7. Nevertheless 
it is not for this reason that many representatives of both the 
categories, even the quite important ones, support the abolition 
or mitigation of the principle8. The compulsoriness should 
not be abolished, but rather reformed, because in reality it is 
a myth. As everyone knows, a widespread discretion pervades 
the actions of the prosecutor in manifold areas regarding the 
“if”, “when” and “how” of the procedure. In fact, even if we 
continue to present prosecution and the acts of the prosecutors 
as a living incarnation of the principle legality-compulsoriness, 
many motivations have avoided the practices of such an attitude 
(Vicoli 2003). 
7  On the commixture of the two sistems in Italy, says Maddalena (2005, p. 130): 
«a trial system that manages to mix the inquisitorial with the adversarial, like ours, 
without the presumptions of the adversarial system that can be found in the United 
States, multiplying the warranties of one and another, contrasts on full hands with 
the principle of reasonable length of the trial. Hence we need to have the preliminary 
investigations, the preliminary audience, the first grade, the appeal, the recourse, the 
judgment for postponement. Think of all the people who decide at the same trial, 
even leaving aside the incidental procedures, hence of the ones in front of the ‘Court 
of Freedom’ (Tribunale della Libertà). And yet, our adversarial system, on top of the 
compulsory prosecution and the wide usage of impugnments, continues to make use 
of other typical principles of the inquisitorial system, like the primacy of substantial 
truth, the free believe of the judge and other».
8  «One of the ways that is used abroad to try to solve the problem of the ratio 
between offer and demand [of justice] regards just the prosecution. We know that in 
other countries the prosecution is discretional, and that discretional choices are also 
influenced by the concrete possibility to obtain a result and therefore by a perspec-
tive of effectiveness in the activation of jurisdiction. In my way of viewing things, the 
discretionality of prosecution is not a solution, even regardless the many good reasons 
that suggest continuing the support of the principle of compulsoriness. […]. I rather 
believe, that in this sector (I say it particularly as for the principle of discretionality 
in the prosecution, but the observation is generally valid for the whole system of 
criminal justice) the systematic use of criteria such as econometric ones could lead to 
paradoxical results» (Illuminati 2005, p. 88).
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A famous criminal Lawyer, nowaday Judge of the Constitu-
tional Court (Corte Costituzionale), stated about this subject in 
his speech at the important meeting concerning the reasonable 
length of criminal trials in Padua (May 2003): “I directly say 
that I have always been […] in favour of compulsory prosecu-
tion […]. Even if we are convinced that the compulsoriness is a 
myth, they are sometimes useful to strengthen our convictions. 
But realistically we note a nearly inescapable discretion of-fact; 
and then the transparency in priority criteria is for sure a step 
forward compared to the situation in which we are today” (Fri-
go 2005, p. 142).
If such criteria were transparent, as introduced by the 
Republic’s Chief Prosecutor on the base of the indications of the 
Parliament, probably some form of priority could be accepted. 
But in Italy until today, this has not happened. And often, in 
everyday-reality it occurs that criteria of this kind are not even 
made homogenous in the same office, because left up to the 
discretion of the individual prosecutors. For example, a situation 
that we pointed out while researching at an averagely big court 
of the Centre-North where we have investigated, among others, 
a Prosecutor:
So, there is no… here in X there is no indication in order to a priority 
in the carrying out of the investigations. […] The gravity of the crime […] 
anyhow there are no criteria of official priority. […] That doesn’t remove – 
let’s say – any of us if he gives some priorities.
The main problem originates from the demand to render the 
priority criteria that are currently confined at a purely informal 
level, homogenous among courts and clear, even at an individual 
level9. The same Prosecutor continues:
9  Concerning the formulation of explicit priority-criteria in the conduction of 
the preliminary investigations about crimes, a very interesting case is the prosecu-
tor’s office of Turin, the first one to have introduced the criteria in 1990 thanks to 
the Republic’s Prosecutor of Turin of that time. It is about the so called “circular 
Zagrebelsky”, in base of which the procedures were subdivided following a descend-
ing order of priority in three categories: the ones in which precautionary measures 
were adopted (prison); the ones related to crimes that were considered severe on 
basis of the personality of the suspected person, of the lesion undergone by the penal 
protected interest, of the reiteration of the crime, of the damage (patrimonial or not) 
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So, you see, I believe that we can’t choose the criteria. […] And then, 
it could have been good that in this occasion it had been considered if the 
prosecutor’s office would provide manifest criteria of priority, i.e. to notify 
the public about the base of these priority criteria. […] We would have 
got the same priority criteria that were criteria of priority, not criteria of 
dismissing criminal proceedings, but that would have been uniform and 
coming from the highest legislative authority in our country. Instead they 
were not.
Other privileged witnesses who were interviewed sustained 
the point of view that it would not be convenient to fix the crite-
ria preventively: the priorities should be inspired exclusively by 
the “common sense” and by the valuations done case by case. A 
Chief Prosecutor of a medium-sized court in Centre-Italy stated 
like this: 
They are criteria of common sense. […] Subjective […] To establish 
priorities based on abstract schemes means to claim the right to exclude 
crimes from penal sanctions that the legislator deems as to be relevant.
As you can guess from those small interview bits, similar 
operative modalities have for important corollary the fact that 
the applied order of priorities is nor unambiguous nor obvious 
in front of the public opinion, as the Chief Prosecutor of Venice 
has claimed at the meeting in Padua: «In today’s situation […] 
the compulsoriness is, in fact, seen as a tendencial principle, 
but we are in front of a substantial discretionality. I believe that 
it is inescapable to think about establishing some criteria that 
allow the Republic’s Prosecutor to direct himself towards the 
number of crimes that arrive daily. […] You cannot assign such 
a power to the Ministry, whose duties, fixed by the Constitution, 
concern the organisation of the service, in other words, means 
and resources that are necessary to a well-functioning of the 
legal system. It also seems difficult to me to assign such a power 
to the ‘Supreme Council of Judges’ (Consiglio Superiore della 
Magistratura). […] Another way that should be taken into 
consideration is an intervention of the Parliament to fix by law 
the criteria that are to be followed by the Republic’s Prosecutors 
in order to be coherent with the constitutional principles – 
caused and not compensated; and the other ones (Zagrebelsky 1991). 
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not arbitrary, not responding to incidental logics or logics of 
impunities in given areas» (Borraccetti 2005, pp. 147-148). 
As Zagrebelsky (1984) argues, the affirmation that pros-
ecution is compulsory entails the exclusion of the fact that the 
prosecutors can discretionarily decide whether or not to involve 
the judges of a crime; moreover, it means necessarily to pro-
vide instruments of control that don’t permit the prosecutors to 
elude the obligation to proceed. But, in reality, it is impossible 
to exclude a priori certain spaces of discretion in the actions of 
this legal actor, no matter how the principle of compulsoriness 
is defined. During the last years, we can observe an increase 
of the crime load as well as a qualitative modification (e.g. the 
spread of criminality among white-collar workers and, on the 
other hand, of crimes linked to clandestine immigration) that 
have forced the prosecutor’s offices to “choose” which crimes 
have first to be proceeded. In this regard, the informally-applied 
discretionality would not depend a lot on legal-normative prin-
ciples, but more on a series of organisational characteristics (ex-
cessive crime load, complexity of the crimes – associative, eco-
nomic and financial, against the public administration, white-
collar worker – low level of standardisation of the prescribed 
behaviours, lack or inefficiency of the controls on what is done 
by the prosecutor). 
It is exactly the considerations about the irremovable 
discretion of prosecution that help us to understand how in 
the practices the difference between legal systems with the 
principle of compulsoriness and legal systems with the principle 
of opportunity is so much less clear than what you may think 
in theory. The systems regulated by the principle of opportunity 
are not characterised by the arbitrariness because of that, but 
rather by the fact that, even in presence of factual presumptions 
or of law, a crime cannot be prosecuted if there are valuable 
reasons for not doing it (Guarnieri 1984)10. 
In this perspective, an accurate analysis cannot be restricted 
to the consideration of principles that regulate the prosecutorial 
10  In this regard, see the already quoted concept of “neutrality” of the prosecu-
tor in Zacharias, Green (2004).
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activities, but has generally to bring into focus the behaviours 
of the prosecutors and of the judges in the everyday reality. Like 
this, the true mechanisms that concretely regulate decisions and 
behaviours should come to light. In other words, we have to 
try to answer to the following questions: to what extend do the 
practices correspond to the normative prescriptions? Which 
normative ideals inspire really the behaviour of the prosecutors 
and the judges?
3. An approach from the inside: the privileged witnesses
The relation between norms and practices and, in particular, 
the modalities of integration of the latter in the field of legal 
systems can be efficiently analysed sociologically by starting from 
an empirical approach of the type “law in action”. In this way, a 
social scientist who is devoted to the analysis of how law works 
is able to highlight aspects that would not emerge from a study 
exclusively using instruments of legal sciences (Friedman 1975; 
as far as the Italian situation is concerned, see Treves 1987 and 
Ferrari 1997)11. As Guarnieri (1984) stated, on a methodological 
and substantial level, the “pure” legal studies can fall into a 
series of limitations when they postulate a more or less perfect 
parallelism between legal norms and regularities of behaviours 
in their application and, at the same time, they don’t take into 
account the practical implications of such a relation. Thus, it often 
finishes by considering that when expected behaviours follow 
to the legal norms, the first being a consequence of the latter. 
Consequently, the simple establishment of norms would reflect 
back to the behaviours that they regulate. On the other side, it 
happens that only little attention is given to the comprehensive 
effects of the use of law, effects that are different from the simple 
and pure observation of a norm, given that from the beginning 
those effects are wanted and underestimating the unexpected 
11  Among the few Italian empirical studies that are based on such a prospective 
are to mention especially the ones conducted by the group of scholars of Di Federico 
(Berti, Mestitz, Palmonari, Sapignoli 1998; Sapignoli 1999; Di Federico, Sapignoli 
2002). 
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results. Those aspects entail that, in the field of the sociology of 
law, descriptions based only on “legal data” often result to be 
either misleading or of little relevance on a substantial level.
The differences between norms and practices are sociologically 
– concrete – not comprehensible, when comparing exclusively, 
on the base of the legal theory, the systems that are based on 
the principle of legality and the systems that are based on the 
principle of opportunity, i.e. the choice to prosecute on the 
base of political criteria. The advantages linked to an empirical 
qualitative approach, that makes use of original data coming 
from interviews with main social actors of the reality of criminal 
trials, are rather manifold. First, such a type of research permits 
to avoid predictable answers or interpretations of phenomena 
based on common sense. But instead, it is really important to 
consider and understand why the operators of law put certain 
strategies to use and which fundamental factors are guiding 
their choices (Nelken, Zanier 2006).
Potential projects to reform the penal code have to be 
considered in the light of empirical analyses of what’s happening 
daily at the courts, in order to attribute the right importance 
to the contribution of the privileged witnesses that work 
professionally in the criminal-law system. In other words, if 
you want that the suggested changes can have, at least to some 
extend, the effects the legislator hoped for, the possible reforms 
and their articulation should lie upon observable or hypothetical 
relations between social phenomena.
4. The Italian case: the prosecution subjectively discretionary
4.1 The taboo of the discretional prosecution
Let’s take again in more details the discussion about some 
empirical material obtained from conversations with operators 
of law about the issue of exercise of prosecution. As said 
above, the principle of compulsoriness of prosecution is for 
many magistrates sacred and untouchable, even if they admit 
that they are rarely respected because of practical needs. For 
some, this principle could even be surpassed normatively, but 
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the conditions and the characteristics of the Italian legal system 
and of our country in general (politics, culture, society) avoid 
the introduction of forms of discretion, just like it is intended in 
the systems of other countries.
The “Substitute General Prosecutor” (Sostituto Procuratore 
Generale) of a quite important court in the South, who puts the 
principle of compulsory prosecutions at the same level as the 
one of equality of all citizens in front of law - both sanctions by 
our Constitution – argues like that: 
The Constitutional Court has clearly recognised that it is evidently a 
fundamental principle, unchangeable, the one of equality, that is a funda-
mental unchangeable principle the one of the compulsory prosecution, that 
is linked to the one of equality.
The President of the section of “Preliminary Investigation 
Judge” (G.i.p.) at a medium-sized court in the Centre-North 
highlights historic, political and cultural Italian specificity, that 
blocks a reform of the compulsory prosecution: 
I don’t have any difficulties to say that with a… with a different history 
on the shoulders of the Italian State, with a less young democracy than 
ours, I would be less biased towards the discretionality of prosecution, but 
since the political situation is not like that […] I would consider it very 
difficult to move to discretionality, even if I now fully realize that to carry 
out or not a trial – in the mass of all things to be considered – is an exercise 
in discretion.
A Judge exerting the same role in another medium-sized 
court of the Centre, agrees by saying:
The discretionality as such exists already for a while. […] But as to 
affirm it normatively… the affirmed principle a priori, written, is scary, all 
in all.
In the daily reality even the judges are endowed with discre-
tionality, especially when considering the choice for which trails 
to treat first. A Judge, President of a “penal section” (sezione 
penale) who was interviewed in a small court in the North ob-
serves that it is becoming an operative necessity, that is in prac-
tice impossible to ignore. The same privileged witness introduces 
the important matter of the opportunity to establish criteria:
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Without a normative deflation, i.e. without the legislator, we should 
make ourselves an operative deflation or, better said, choose ourselves the 
priority criteria […]. We acknowledge that the idea to do all trials, as it 
would seem to postulate the principle of compulsory prosecution, is not 
possible. Hence, well, we have to agree on these selection criteria. Which 
trials we conduct and which ones we don’t.
Could these criteria be established locally? 
When you say to a judge: look, in this trial you know what we are 
doing… we take it and we store it in a closet… It’s like I amputated his arm 
because it takes a lot of efforts to come off that idea, really off-limits, so for 
many years we thought of the article 112 of the Constitution in terms of… 
so that… of absolute cogency, of irremovable benchmark. So now we have 
difficulties to say: listen, if we put this file in a closet it is because it is of a 
lower priority than another. It’s a very critical question.
Another President of a “penal section”, who was interviewed 
at a large court in the North, agrees about the discretion de 
facto that exists also in the decision of what trials to conduct. 
The fact that the criteria linked to such a choice are not at all 
territorially homogenous renders it even more severe: 
Yet the enormous abundance of criminal hypothesis that are, still now, 
expected to increase in the field of the Italian penal system, manages well to 
leave many trials unfiled and is therefore there a sort of, by now, uncritical 
acceptance of the fact that the exercise of prosecution is in reality performed 
on an optional base and not in an obligatory manner.
As the same Judge continues, such criteria should be orien-
tated to the constitutional principles and values, like they tried 
to do at the prosecutor’s office of Turin with the already quoted 
“circular Zagrebelsky”:
To establish priority criteria on the base of constitutional values, so to 
say for example that the protection of the physical and psychic integrity 
of a person prevails on the protection of the pure and exclusively intended 
patrimony. Thus, to avoid making arbitrary decisions, but to make deci-
sions that anchor the priorities of which trials to carry out by using consti-
tutional values. The operation was attempted at a local trial court of Turin 
by a prominent magistrate, Vladimiro Zagrebelsky.
That the principle of compulsory prosecution in practice is a 
myth is confirmed by a penal Lawyer of defendants and victims 
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(parte civile), who was interviewed in a small court in the North. 
He specifies the criteria that, in his opinion, influence the choices 
of the prosecutor: 
Of course, all crimes linked to organised criminality have priority; I’d 
say the blood-crimes or also voluntary homicide, all the crimes against a 
person that were particularly severe, I am talking about sexual assault, 
crimes against the public administration, extortion and corruption and 
many others.
4.2 Discretion or common sense?
A privileged witness who is working as a “Preliminary 
Investigation Judge” (G.i.p.) claims that in his point of view 
the question of priority does not exist, because he rigorously 
follows the chronological order, by arranging a hearing the 
first available day, when it’s necessary. But, in continuing this 
discussion, we will fall again on the crucial subject of “common 
sense” linked to the decision taking: the effective possibility to 
file trials and to sentence the culprit should be taken into account 
when establishing the order of the hearings. In other words – the 
interviewee continues – in the case of procedures with non-EU 
(immigrants) defendants securely out of reach, it would even be 
useless to carry on with the trials. How could someone argue 
that it is not an operative strategy marked by discretion, and 
even a quite large one?
Like for everything, you’d need to have a bit of common sense. Then, if 
we send ahead a series of trials with unreachable non-EU citizens – we have 
already sent ahead thousands of trials that are useless because those people 
will never be found and because this is all ‘paper’ that is past, we’ve made 
statistics and we are all happy.
When the Author expressed her objection about the discre-
tion that informs about a similar type of procedure, the answer 
was as follows:
It’s nonsense; those are so practical things that they don’t carve on the 
discretionality of the prosecution. […] According to me, it is not a matter 
of discretion, it is really a question of common practical sense.
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Openly, even the Chief Prosecutor of a medium-sized prose-
cutor’s office in the Centre of Italy talks about those criteria that 
are formally not foreseen, but inspired by the common sense: 
Naturally, about the trials that fall on each prosecutor, choices are made 
and have always been made. […] The colleague gears towards criteria of 
common sense that should be a bit… that should follow a bit the… so … 
the seriousness of the case. If there is an abuse in a family, a person that 
lives for years… or even a violation of the duties of the family members… 
I am very sensitive to those things. […] And then what happens? What 
happens is… if there is a violation of the duties of family members, the 
parents, usually the father, who – unless he leaves – doesn’t give money for 
his children… so well… a colleague that is sensitive to such a problem takes 
care of such a matter before a case of fraud, that’s it. But if now the fraud 
lays the economical capacity of a family, then… then you’d give priority to 
the fraud. But these things can’t be fixed a priori because of the very serious 
error, to me, in my foolish opinion, is not to consider that the seriousness 
of the case is not defined by an article of the law, but by the circumstances 
of the concrete case, isn’t it?
Such points of view come directly from operators of law 
and inform us about the everyday reality of the application 
of norms in various courts. That is exactly why they give the 
opportunity to investigate the concepts of compulsoriness and 
of discretionality de facto of prosecution in order to deepen the 
definition, the meaning, and the important impacts on the whole 
system of criminal justice. 
4.3 The criterion of the seriousness of the crime
From these statements we can identify some principles that 
influence the decisions-criteria, that we have seen quite a few 
times as “discretionary”, taken by prosecutors. The exercise of 
prosecution is obligatory, but in reality it is often the seriousness 
of the crime that points the choices of the prosecutor about 
proceeding and about the priority of the treatment of the notitiae 
criminis. The Chief Prosecutor of a small court in the Centre-
North of Italy sayd: 
Therefore, this should be the principle, it goes without saying that the 
abused little girl and the precautionary measures that are taken, or, I don’t 
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know, even kidnapping of a person, or murder… To those cases we give 
priority.
As a penal Lawyer who works at the same court confirms, at 
the prosecutor’s office more or less formal criteria are established 
in order to decide about when to proceeding crimes:
Criminal offences linked to environmental pollutions often remained 
quite immobile/steady, and financial crimes, tributaries, cases of bankrupt-
cy… budget frauds and crimes of this kind. The crimes that are sent to 
trial quite hastily are the crimes… well, the crimes implying prison inmates 
– obvious – because drug-crimes without inmates have also long waiting-
times. Offences of medical faults, matters like that… let’s say, maybe even 
crimes with civil interests are privileged by the prosecutors., where you 
know that there is an offended person.
Even if at an important prosecutor’s office in the Centre-
North no indication from the side of the Chief Prosecutor con-
cerning the criteria about the carrying-out of investigations can 
be found, it does not mean – as a Prosecutor argues – that each 
component of the pool is not being given himself priorities, in 
the meaning that procedures regarding particularly relevant in-
terests, on economic and personal level, are treated first:
Homicides, personally, I consider them obviously as proceedings of 
high priority.
The “Assistant Prosecutor” (Procuratore Aggiunto) of a small 
office in the North of Italy confirms that, in practice, priority 
criteria are used when choosing the crimes to proceed. Most 
of the time, they overlap with the seriousness of the committed 
crime:
The seriousness of the crimes, the social warning that they can provoke, 
the danger by the defendants, the repeating offences by criminal associa-
tions, these are about the types of offences that make us say, those trials 
have priority compared to others.
It may happen that the discretion in the exerting the 
prosecution arrives to a point where it fails to proceeding 
certain crimes that are considered less severe or less likely to 
awaken social warning among the population. The following 
quote contains quite serious affirmations of a penal Lawyer of 
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defendants and victims from a court in the South. As you can 
guess, this privileged witness is quite critical towards such a 
modality of acting of the prosecutor’s office. Note that in his 
words the suspension of the actual prosecution arrives to adopt 
the connotation of “local amnesty”. Furthermore, consider the 
importance of the local legal culture in the interpretation of 
these practices: 
I think, how shall I say, it seems to me that you can find confirmations 
for your judgment in the decision of the local prosecutor’s office to suspend 
the prosecution especially regarding less severe crimes. Some time ago, the 
chief prosecutor decided, during a period when everyone was talking about 
amnesty, to indulge, a bit like nowadays, maybe with less conviction, that 
the excessive caseload […] would have merited kind of a local amnesty and 
would have entailed a suspension of the prosecution de facto […]. It’s true: 
a minor seriousness, of course, condemns them into a limbo.
4.4  The “good” and the “bad” faith of the prosecutor. To 
interpret the norms in practices that are useful?
Could prosecutors use the wide discretion they have in 
prosecuting to their advantage? In this direction point the serious 
affirmations of some lawyers who were interviewed at several 
courts, and that lead one to suspect that the prosecutors can 
act, under some conditions, in “bad” faith. To avoid having to 
proceed immediately, the prosecutor can use the strategy of not 
indicating the name of the person who is to investigate, even if 
he knows him or that person would be easily identifiable, just by 
opening an investigation “against unknowns” (contro ignoti), 
which is usually done last, following the chronological order. 
A Lawyer at a medium-big-sized court in the Centre-North 
has put it like this:
A specific case? Well, it happens that… in more or less abstract exam-
ples, without giving names, yes, it happens that Tizio complains about the 
fact that Caio has fooled him into a certain corporate issue; normally the 
prosecutor, if he’s busy as he should be, considering the number of proof 
about crimes there are, normally takes the case, puts it aside and says: 
‘as soon as I can, I’ll have a look’. It may happen that he doesn’t look at 
it for a long time. To avoid having to look at it with a certain attention, 
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or at least not to be too much constrained by norms, the prosecutor has 
several systems: one is not to indicate the name of the person that should be 
subject to investigations, so that there’ll be an obliged investigation against 
unknowns… such as people to identify… with other possibilities, other 
times, other administration.
As this Lawyer goes on, the majority of the criminal offences 
that are reported to the prosecutor’s office pertain to burglaries 
by unknown people, thefts on the streets, denunciations for 
stolen car radios, bicycles, motor bikes, or even more important 
and serious matters. But: 
However it happens that even in cases where the culprit could be found 
easily, the person is shelved as unknown, as ‘to identify’, just because he/she 
was not directly identified when the complaint was lodged; and by ‘iden-
tify’ we mean: first name, last name, address, date of birth, etc.
And about this strategy, he adds a “small technical annota-
tion”:
There was a moment when someone thought that if the prosecutor files 
a subject who had previously been identified, as unknown or not identified, 
the judge could say later on… could rap the prosecutor’s knuckles and say: 
dear prosecutor, you claimed that… this one was unknown and therefore 
you filed him as unknown, you wrote his name seven months after, but in 
reality you knew it already five months before that, so I’m going to back-
date everything to that time. […] Recently the ‘Supreme Court’ (Corte di 
Cassazione) has said: no, no, the prosecutor can do whatever he wants; 
that means, it’s his prerogative to identify a person and he does it when he 
thinks it is necessary, appropriate; if he messes up, he could be subject to 
disciplinary sanctions, but otherwise, from the point of view of the trial, 
everything is alright. This entails that the technique of using the unknowns 
has gained ground.
Another Lawyer of a big court in the North has also been very 
critical about the exercise of forms of discretion in the handling 
of crimes from the side of the prosecutor’s offices, highlighting 
the strong differences of these practices:
So then, I personally, but also everyone that thinks about it like me, 
and we’re many, we are absolutely not willing that the prosecution is not 
compulsory anymore but surreptitious, in the meaning that the single 
offices decide when they make the tables, saying: those crimes shall be 
proceeded instead of other ones, or those ones are proceeded before the 
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others… there are various groups A, B, C and D. This means that there are 
some crimes, that are assigned to a prosecutor and we know that he will 
never look at them, and they will nicely become time-barred (prescritti), 
even if these crimes often become a tragedy for the offended person, he/she 
can complain as long as he wants, but…
5. Practical adaptations of the legality principle 
As noted, the perennial lack of resources of the Italian criminal 
justice system is one of the reasons that forces prosecutors to 
determine priorities and to define the crime problem. Amongst 
the subjective criteria that shape the way legal actors define 
the crime problem there are: the organization of courts and 
prosecution office in specialized units, the riti alternativi and the 
prescrizione. In essence, the riti alternativi are “speedy trials” 
that can quickly push out of the system certain cases. Normally, 
these imply a reduction of the accused person(s) rights but, at 
the same time, a reduction of the punishment. The prescrizione 
suspends the proceedings.
In this sense, the analysis of the law in action can suggest 
observations that would be useful for possible future reforms 
aimed at tackling the major problem affecting Italian criminal 
procedure: hearings within a reasonable time (Nelken, Zanier 
2006).
5.1 Specialized units
Specialized units for judges and prosecutors normally deal 
with the vast majority of the crime reports. They are designed 
to treat these cases within a reasonable time. Moreover, this 
substantially reduces the risk of prescrizione.
The Turin prosecution office seems to be an interesting case-
study to understand the specialized units’ functions. As noted 
by Sarzotti (2007), this prosecution office is not organized as a 
condominio, and it is more efficient. A condominio is composed 
by different rooms within which the actors have a great degree 
of autonomy and do not often interact with each other. This kind 
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of organization is, in theory, not very efficient. In Turin there are 
9 specialized units: sexual crimes and vulnerable victims (i.e. 
disabled persons, old people, etc.), organized crime, DDA (mafia 
and other big crime organizations), white-collar crimes, urban 
safety (e.g. street crime), copyright and informatics crimes, 
terrorism, public administration and industrial security. Each 
unit is managed by a deputy chief prosecutor. In general, the 
team of prosecutors working in each unit meets regularly and 
they seem to be well co-ordinated.
The interviewees claim that the reasons behind the creation 
of certain specialized units have to be found in the local legal 
culture. The most important criterion is, probably, the size 
of the prosecution office, because specialized units are not 
efficient in very small offices. In a small prosecution office in 
the Centre-North of Italy crime reports are allocated according 
to the turno posta12. Under the turno posta, for a fixed period 
(which, normally, goes from a few days to one week repeated 
during the year), a particular prosecutor takes all the files which 
arrive. In practice, during that fixed period, all the crime reports 
which arrive from private citizens (and their lawyers), the 
police and, occasionally, from prosecutors who decide to start 
an investigation, go to the prosecutors taking the turno posta. 
These will read the crime reports and they will set up the files, 
even if they only want to drop the case. The Chief Prosecutor 
explained the problems linked to specialized units when the 
prosecution office is small:
If the office is small, I will have a specialized unit with one assistant 
prosecutor. He or she will be the specialized unit.
 In a big prosecution office there are more prosecutors allo-
cated to each unit. The local Chief Prosecutor said:
In this prosecution office there are 5 units: CSF sexual crimes and 
domestic violence, COR organized crime, CEC white-collar crimes, CPA 
public administration and CRT tax evasion.
12  This means: “internal mail turn”. It is called like this because files move with-
in the prosecution office as a sort of internal mail. 
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An Assistant Prosecutor remarked that, for crimes like 
prostitution and illegal immigration, the specialized units are 
useful to monitor the different ethnic groups and the criminal 
activities they may be involved with.
The problem is that specialized units within prosecution offices 
do not always mirror judges’ units. Courts and prosecution offices 
are not organized in the same way. A Magistrato interestingly 
notes that in Milan both the prosecution office and the court 
have a specialized unit dealing with white-collar crimes. This 
does not happen in the area where he works now. So, legal 
culture does not only concern the size of the prosecution office 
and/or court. It is also linked to the local crime problems:
I worked in Milan and we had a specialized unit dealing with white-
collar crimes […] the same had the court of appeal. The President of the 
court is responsible for the way the court has to be organized.
The organization is similar in another big size court and 
prosecution office in the North. The President of the criminal 
court said:
Specialized units have been created following an agreement between 
the prosecution office, the preliminary investigation judge office (G.i.p.) 
and the preliminary hearing judge office (G.u.p.). […] Specialized units 
were created in each office. So, criminal proceedings are divided between 
an area, that we can call miscellaneous, that includes the crime reports that 
do not fall into any specialized units. Then there are the specialized units: 
white-collar crimes, sexual crimes and crimes against minors, organized 
crime, etc. Then there are the old specializations: town planning, pollution, 
industrial accidents.
5.2 The riti alternativi 
As many academics have noted13, the structure set out in the 
1989 adversarial reform of Italian criminal procedure requires 
substantial resources and is very time consuming. In other words: 
it can be somewhat less efficient and it could sometimes not be 
fully applied. This is why the legislator also provided for the 
riti alternativi. These may also increase the discretionary powers 
13  See, for example, Aimonetto 1997.
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retained by legal actors because they can, de facto, simplify or 
even cancel a phase of the criminal proceeding.
In essence, the most economical of the riti alternativi is the 
proceeding by penal decree. This is basically a unilateral offer 
by the prosecutor to avoid the trial and to accept a discounted 
fine. If there is no opposition, there is no trial. Both the giudi‑
zio direttissimo (accelerated trial) and the giudizio immediato 
(immediate judgement) circumvent the preliminary hearing. Fi-
nally, the trial can be also avoided through plea-bargaining and/
or giudizio abbreviato (summary trial). These are triggered by 
an agreement between the parties.
Recent socio-legal research illustrates that prosecutors’ legal 
culture and the organizational structure of the prosecution of-
fice influence the riti alternativi implementation. Where there 
are specialized units, practice appears to be more homogeneous 
and more efficient. At the same time, the local crime problems 
become relevant. Legal actors’ decisions are also very important. 
Some Authors have argued that, sometimes, lawyers choose to 
go to trial (instead of using the riti alternativi) in order to in-
crease their salary and to delay the proceeding to reach the pre‑
scrizione (Fabri 1997).
The case of the Turin prosecution office is, once again, a good 
example of good practices that effectively tackled the problem 
of time consuming criminal proceedings. The interviewees 
listed three conditions that are instrumental to the good 
functioning of the prosecution office. Firstly, the investigation 
must be accurate and complete. Secondly, the prosecutor who 
directed the investigation should be the same that represents the 
accusation before the first instance court. Finally, when one of 
the riti alternativi is triggered, the punishment reduction should 
be carefully considered, so that it really becomes an incentive for 
the accused person(s). The Chief Prosecutor said:
This surely is useful in practice. Here in Turin the 1/3 reduction of the 
punishment is effective, not just on paper.
Further research should concentrate on the potentialities of 
these practices in other prosecution offices and on the necessary 
conditions for their applications.
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A high ranked Prosecutor (Nannucci 2000,1885-1888) in 
Florence criticized these practices: «Today we do the abbreviato 
following the accused person(s) request […] they just have to 
ask and they get a punishment reduction. And the prosecutor 
cannot appeal. This is not equality of arms. […] The question 
concerns the effectiveness of this system, if it can cure the origi-
nal sin: this should be a trial for those who cannot afford it. 
They get a reduction and they agree to be tried on the basis of 
the evidence collected by the prosecutor, who was considered 
the opponent. The real trials are for those who can afford it, 
because they are expensive and time consuming».
The riti alternativi carry, thus, a risk: the bifurcation of 
the criminal process. The quick trials (abbreviato and plea-
bargaining) are for those who cannot afford a real trial. These 
are, for example, the immigrants who are accused of illegal 
immigration (the Bossi-Fini Act) or those who are caught red-
handed, and no investigation is required. The real trials, that 
are very time consuming, are for those who can afford it, like 
accused person(s) involved in white-collar crimes. These have 
financial and cultural resources and can afford a proper defence. 
These trials are normally more respectful of the accused person(s) 
rights and, because they are very time-consuming, they can lead 
to the prescrizione.
A Lawyer explained the crimes that normally trigger the riti 
alternativi:
Normally the giudizio abbreviato works well for crimes involving drug. 
This is really a problem for the society […] both the victims, both the 
accused persons, because they are 20, 22 years old […] and they get 13, 14, 
15 years of imprisonment […] everyday there are so many cases whereby 
we use the abbreviato.
Another Lawyer discussed the financial problems:
For the clients, plea-bargaining is less expensive than a trial. This means 
that there are certain crimes and perpetrators. […] I mean the foreigners.
The same Lawyer explained that wealthy clients are in a dif-
ferent position:
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I rarely have very wealthy clients. But I may lose them immediately if 
I explain them that, for example, plea-bargaining would cost much less. 
They say: who do you think I am?
5.3 The prescrizione
Within the Italian criminal justice system time is a crucial 
issue. Criminal proceedings are very time consuming and, as 
noted in the outset, prescrizione may block the prosecution 
of crimes and trials as well. So, the legal rules must be also 
analyzed in the light of prescrizione’s practical impact in the 
criminal justice system. For example, lawyers can try to delay 
the proceedings and simply wait for the prescrizione.
A Magistrato working in the Centre-North of Italy described 
the extent to which the prescrizione, in practice, influences the 
way proceedings will develop:
Something strange happened […] the most serious crimes have been 
postponed because the prescrizione is really long. […] For example, the 
prescrizione for bankruptcy arrives after twenty two years and a half. 
Similar opinions were expressed by the President of a big 
criminal law court in the North of Italy:
If one has to consider the prescrizione, less serious cases have to be 
treated first […] this is because the prescrizione is quicker. In this way, you 
do not consider cases like white-collar crimes and crimes against public 
administration. You wait a long time, because the prescrizione is longer.
A Counsel confirmed this view:
I now have a case in front of the court of appeal that will be blocked 
because of the prescrizione, these are serious crimes. […] I have a false 
accounting, the prescrizione arrived last year. The court still has to decide, 
but you just have to look at the dates…
Some Authors focused on the prescrizione as one of the cri-
teria for the decision-making that can shape prosecutors’ discre-
tionary choices. In essence, the prescrizione can undermine the 
legality principle, because it is a potential criterion to choose 
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the crime reports that will be prioritized14. Prosecutors may act 
promptly whenever the prescrizione is about to block the pro-
ceedings (Fabri 1997). Some other crimes are just left to the 
prescrizione, as noted a Magistrato:
I mean, the crimes like resisting a constable, I do not deal with them, I 
wait for the prescrizione.
A Lawyer believes that judges (and not prosecutors) have the 
real discretionary power to determine how important the pre‑
scrizione will be:
The role of prescrizione is strongly influenced by the judge. This is 
because he or she can decide on mitigating circumstances that determine 
the punishment and as a consequence the length of the prescrizione.
Finally, many Lawyers believe that the prescrizione is one of 
the aims for a good counsel. This is not illegal, they just exploit 
the legal resources as much as they can:
One of the first things to do is to look at the prescrizione.
The counsel always relies on time. It is a very good advisor.
I would be a liar, if I say that time is not one of the defence strategies.
One Lawyer said that the prescrizione is “a part of the life”:
Yes, it is part of the life. Now, I am not sure who said that: there is 
always time to die, to pay and to be convicted. Something like that.
6. Concluding remarks
Analysing the motivations and references of the internal legal 
culture (national and/or local) that affect the operative strategies 
of prosecutors on the topic of prosecution, but also of judges 
on the order of trials, has a significant impact on the theoreti-
cal as well as practical implementation of the criminal policies. 
This is because the introduction of a discretionality de facto not 
only violates a constitutional principle, but also implies a seri-
14  See, for example, Giunta and Micheletti 2003.
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ous consequence, that causes a local discontinuity of the applied 
priority orders, so that the citizens are not equal in front of the 
law.
As the empirical data that we have presented show, the 
compulsory prosecution is a myth, but, at the same time, also 
a taboo that is daily violated by the ones that are supposed to 
carry it out. In the case of subjective discretion, the principle 
of “common sense” is invoked, the only possibility for many 
prosecutors to face the amount of work, that is rightly accounted 
as excessive. The common sense appears, for example, when 
considering the seriousness of a crime as informal, but acceptable, 
criteria. 
I tried to make a distinction between good and bad practices. 
There are different reasons that shape their implementation: 
impossibility to apply certain legal rules, time-consuming 
proceedings, backlog of cases, legal actors’ interests and 
professional values, and many others. Certainly good practices 
have a vital role and should be preserved. Moreover, this 
research has emphasized the need for more structured rules that 
should define the framework within which the good practices 
operate. Reforms are certainly difficult to frame. The complexity 
is also linked to legal actors’ discretionary powers. This is one 
of the crucial issues: the mechanisms that shape legal actors’ 
discretionary powers. There are different conditions, like local 
crime problems, that determine the way a case will be treated. 
Similar cases can be treated in a very different way. The Italian 
criminal justice thus can appear bifurcated and accused persons 
with different social and financial situation are sometimes 
treated differently by the legal system.
The need to rethink about those problems regarding the 
prosecution and the institutional position of the prosecutor is 
becoming more and more urgent, especially in the light of facts. 
The key-point is to identify the direction to choose: to continue 
sticking to the duo independence of the prosecutor/compulsory 
prosecution, or to insist on a radical change towards the opposite 
duo: dependence-opportunity? Apart from the possible risks of 
political interferences on the activity of the prosecutors/elected 
following the American model (Chiavario 1998), according to 
122 maria letizia zanier
prominent jurists15 the abolition of the constitutional principle 
of the compulsory prosecution would have a series of impacts 
on a large part of the values that make up the whole Italian 
Constitution. But on the other hand, once you approve the 
principle of compulsoriness, it will be necessary to improve the 
implementation by taking adequate measures.
What measures could be suggested in order to restrict the 
workload of the prosecutor’s offices that are overloaded with 
the daily flood of criminal offences? If we want to learn from 
the American lesson and from the opinions of many law-experts 
and operators, perhaps we should consider the suggestion about 
the introduction of priority criteria and orders in the handling of 
offences, but without conceding a discretionary prosecution. The 
aim should be to reveal and regulate the discretion from which 
essentially the prosecutor profits in proceeding crimes, so that 
his initiatives become clear and controllable. Such criteria are 
nothing else than work-planning modalities at the prosecutor’s 
offices, according to priority schemes the rationalisation of the 
management of criminal offences through objective parameters 
that are reasonable and especially recognisable by everyone. 
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